Armistice Terms

Facebook 0
Twitter
LinkedIn 0
Reddit 0
Delicious
Digg
StumbleUpon 0
WhatsApp
Email
Print

The Armistice was negotiated over a period of two days, November 8-9, 1918.  The term negotiate is not actually accurate.  The Allies through Marshal Foch dictated the terms to be accepted or not by the Germans.  The Germans won a few minor points, but basically the Armistice is an Allied product with virtually no input from the defeated Germans.  Here are the terms of the Armistice:

 

I. Military Clauses on Western Front

One – Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

Two – Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from the signature of the armistice.  German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war.  Occupation by the allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas.  All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms.

Three – Reparation beginning at once to be completed within fifteen days of all the inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted).

Four – Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following war material: Five thousand guns (2,500 heavy, and 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 minenwerfer, 1,700 airplanes (fighters, bombers – firstly, all of the D 7’S and all the night bombing machines).  The above to be delivered in situ to the allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Five – Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine.  The countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local troops of occupation.  The occupation of these territories will be carried out by allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne), together with the bridgeheads at these points of a thirty-kilometre radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions.  A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the stream and at a distance of ten kilometres, from the frontier of Holland up to the frontier of Switzerland.  The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine-lands (left and right bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of sixteen days, in all, thirty-one days after the signing of the armistice.  All the movements of evacuation or occupation are regulated by the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Six – In all territories evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants.  No person shall be prosecuted for offences of participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice.  No destruction of any kind shall be committed.  Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions, and equipment, not removed during the time fixed for evacuation.  Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ.  Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be removed.

Seven – Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.  All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain.  Five thousand locomotives and 150,000 wagons in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed in annexure No. 2, and total of which shall not exceed thirty-one days.  There shall likewise be delivered 5,000 motor lorries (camion automobiles) in good order, within the period of thirty-six days.  The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the period of thirty-one days, together with pre-war personnel and material.  Further, the material necessary for the working of railways in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left in situ.  All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent ways, signals, and repair shops shall be left in situ.  These stores shall be maintained by Germany in so far as concerns the working of the railroads in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine.  All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them.  The note, annexure No. 2, regulates the details of these measures.

Eight – The German command shall be responsible for revealing within the period of forty-eight hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delayed action fuses on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction.  It also shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs and wells, etc.).  All under penalty of reprisals.

Nine – The right of requisition shall be exercised by the allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern.  The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Ten – The immediate repatriation without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons tinder trial or convicted.  The allied powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of them as they wish.  This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including the one of July, 1918, in course of ratification.  However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before.  The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

Eleven – Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel, who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

II. Disposition Relative to the Eastern Frontiers of Germany

Twelve – All German troops at present in the territories which before belonged to Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, shall withdraw immediately within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August First, Nineteen Fourteen.  All German troops at present in the territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall likewise withdraw within the frontiers of Germany, defined as above, as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of these territories, shall decide that the time for this has come.

Thirteen – Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilians as well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (as defined before 1914) to be recalled.

Fourteen – German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914).

Fifteen – Renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

Sixteen – The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

III. Clause Concerning East Africa

Seventeen – Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

IV. General Clauses

Eighteen – Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed of all interned civilians, including hostages under trial or convicted, belonging to the Allied or associated powers other than those enumerated in Article Three.

Nineteen – The following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done.  While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or reparation for war losses.  Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the national bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries.  Restitution of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power.  This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

V. Naval Conditions

Twenty – Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships.  Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Twenty-one – All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of the allied and associated powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

Twenty-two – Surrender to the Allies and United States of all submarines (including submarine cruisers and all mine-laying submarines) now existing, with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which shall be specified by the Allies and United States.  Those which cannot take the sea shall be disarmed of the personnel and material and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States.  The submarines which are ready for the sea shall be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders shall be received by wireless for their voyage to the port designated for their delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment.  The conditions of this article shall be carried into effect within the period of fourteen days after the signing of the armistice.

Twenty-three – German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States shall be immediately disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports or in default of them in allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States.  They will there remain under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States, only caretakers being left on board.  The following warships are designated by the Allies: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers (including two mine layers), fifty destroyers of the most modern types.  All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States and are to be completely disarmed and classed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States.  The military armament of all ships of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore.  All vessels designated to be interned shall be ready to leave the German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice.  Directions for the voyage will be given by wireless.

Twenty-four – The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

Twenty-five – Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers.  To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries, and defence works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Cattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters, without any question of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

Twenty-six – The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture.  The Allies and the United States should give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

Twenty-seven – All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

Twenty-eight – In evacuating the Belgian coast and ports Germany shall abandon in situ and in fact all port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus, and supplies of every kind.

Twenty-nine – All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned and German materials as specified in Clause Twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

Thirty – All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the allied and associated powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

Thirty-one – No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

Thirty-two – The German Government will notify the neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the allied and associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials, or not, are immediately cancelled.

Thirty-three – No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

VI. Duration of Armistice

Thirty-four – The duration of the armistice is to be thirty days, with option to extend.  During this period if its clauses are not carried into execution the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, which must give warning forty-eight hours in advance.  It is understood that the execution of Articles 3 and 18 shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution.  In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions, the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted.  This commission will act under the authority of the allied military and naval Commanders in Chief.

VII. The Limit for Reply

Thirty-five – This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within seventy-two hours of notification.

This armistice has been signed the Eleventh of November, Nineteen Eighteen, at 5 o’clock French time.

F. FOCH.
R. E. WEMYSS.
ERZBERGER.
A. OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT.
VON SALOW.

 

The Armistice ending the Great War was signed at 5:00 AM on November 11, 1918.

More to explorer

27 Comments

  1. Okay Don, it has been said that the restrictions in this armistice were too rigid thus leading to WWII as a result. What are your thoughts?

  2. Of course, the Allies would have first had to have driven the Germans out of France. . . .

    As Pershing wanted to do.

  3. With the fleet in mutiny and rebellions breaking out throughout Germany, the Imperial German Army would likely have collapsed prior to the end of 1918. The Armistice saved a defeated German Army from the humiliation of an utter defeat that was coming fast towards them in any case.

  4. The great error of the Versailles Treaty was its failure to provide for the permanent French occupation of the whole Left Bank of the Rhine and the Rhine bridgeheads; something Maréchal Foch pointed out at the time.

  5. Japan is, well, a strange country. That’s not necessarily a bad thing, but it is just a fact that not every country (and maybe no other country) could make the kind of changes Japan made with the Meiji Restoration and the Westernization that followed.

    The reason it worked in post-war Germany is that the Nazi religion promised military victory.
    A. If Nazism is true, then Germany must win WW2.
    B. But Germany did not win WW2.
    C. Therefore, Nazism is not true.
    It doesn’t work when the equivalent of that major premise is missing. That’s why Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople could fall to Islam without everyone abandoning Christianity: Christianity never promised military success. There is a real difference between a system failing to succeed by its own standards vs being suppressed by external force; if you come to a war of ideas or a war or religions with only a sword, you end up eventually being converted yourself. If all the bishops with valid apostolic succession were to be killed, putting an end to 5 of the 7 sacraments, that would probably disprove Catholicism; if a valid Pope were to announce ex cathedra that he was God, not Jesus of Nazareth, that would definitely disprove Catholicism. For the “master race” to definitively lose in spite of the best efforts of their new “messiah” was a similar blow to Nazi ideology.

    Let me know when your plan succeeds in Afghanistan, if you live that long. At least the Soviets knew when to cut their losses.

  6. “The reason it worked in post-war Germany”

    Because only a lunatic could imagine that Germany had not been utterly defeated, ground into the dirt with all German major cities then collections of rubble, and that future resistance would be suicidal. As for Afghanistan, a geographic expression that has not known any extended period of peace since the time of Alexander the Great, the only true “solution” would be as follows:

  7. Would you be willing to change all your beliefs if your government lost a war?
    I’m afraid you will never understand the history of Poland or Ireland with that point of view.

  8. If all the bishops with valid apostolic succession were to be killed, putting an end to 5 of the 7 sacraments, that would probably disprove Catholicism;

    That’s already been tried and proved wanting.

    if a valid Pope were to announce ex cathedra that he was God, not Jesus of Nazareth, that would definitely disprove Catholicism.

    If the Pope declared he was Napoleon, would that disprove Catholicism too? Or would it only prove the Pope insane?

  9. Poland would still be occupied territory between Germany, Russia and Austria but for the results of the Great War and the outcome of the Cold War. As for the former land of saints and scholars, the Brits could have held on to it in perpetuity if they had been willing to pay the price to do so. After the Great War the Brits were eager to reduce Imperial commitments and hence Southern Irish independence. However, the Brits over the centuries basically turned Ireland into a mini-England, complete with the English language, sans king or queen. The main thing that the Brits failed to do was to destroy Catholicism in Ireland. That was reserved by fate for the Irish to do on their own.

  10. The reason it worked in post-war Germany is that the Nazi religion promised military victory.

    A. If Nazism is true, then Germany must win WW2.
    B. But Germany did not win WW2.
    C. Therefore, Nazism is not true.

    This is a hopelessly confused statement. Nazi-ism is a social ideology, not a religion. There was an inchoate collection of religious imagery auxilliary to it, but that’s incidental. It’s neither true nor false consequent to military victory or military defeat. It might gain or lose prestige consequent to such an event, but it neither acquires nor loses status as true. Now, Hitler made claims in Mein Kampf which can be subject to empirical test. He was a failed art student with zero employment history babbling about human biology and anthropology, so someone who bothers to read it will find howlers (many of which one might wager he cribbed from some other crank). His claims about the efficacy of elected conciliar institutions are readily disproved.

  11. The great error of the Versailles Treaty was its failure to provide for the permanent French occupation of the whole Left Bank of the Rhine and the Rhine bridgeheads; something Maréchal Foch pointed out at the time.

    As we speak, the territory on the left bank of the Rhine has a population just shy of 11 million. Metropolitan France has a population of about 67 million. “Permanent” occupation of an area populated with politically mobilized foreigners as cognizant as any of industrial technology, who number about 1/6th of your own population. Sounds like a plan.

  12. and the occupation should not have ended until after democracy was firmly in place.

    Again, German had had electoral institutions in place for 50 years at that point. So had the Hapsburg monarchy.

  13. With no control over foreign policy or the Army in reference to Germany. Imperial Germany was a disguised autocracy.

    Only were it so that the military and the diplomatic service comprised the whole of the government. The German Constitution also had this provision

    “The consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Reich, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Federation has taken place. In so far as treaties with foreign states have reference to affairs which, according to Art. 4, belong to the jurisdiction of the legislation, the consent of the Federal Council is requisite for their conclusion, and the sanction of the Reichstag for their coming into force. ”

    and this

    “After 31 December 1871 these contributions must continue to be paid to the Reich Treasury by each State of the Federation. For the calculation thereof the effective peace-time strength, as provisionally settled in Art. 60, will be taken as the basis until it is altered by legislation of the Reichstag. ”

    and this

    “The common disbursements are, as a rule, voted for one year; they may, however, in particular cases, be voted for a longer period.

    During the time of transition mentioned in Art. 60, the estimates of the expenditure for the army, arranged under heads, are to be laid before the Federal Council and the Reichstag, only for their information and as a reminder. ”

    Also, a series of constitutional amendments were adopted in Germany in 1918 which instituted variants of the Westminster model.

  14. “Poland would still be occupied territory between Germany, Russia and Austria but for the results of the Great War.”

    Very true. The Hapsburgs let Poles in Galicia be Poles. That’s about all they got out of being in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Certainly a chance at making a decent living wasn’t included.
    German (Prussian) and Russian repression of Poles was often brutal. My greatgrandfather Łaszyński (note – he changed the spelling and kept the pronunciation) left Russian-dominated Warsaw and stowed away on an ocean liner to get to the US.

    Every one of those empires – German, Russian and Hapsburg – deserved to lose. I am grateful to God they did.

    The armistice did not end military actions. Churchill, in a couple of his not-so-great quotes, said something to the effect that the great powers were done fighting and now the pygmies were fighting. He also called Poland a “greedy hyena” in reference to Polish territorial demands during the Versailles conferences. I find that hypocritical, giving that Great Britain has stuck its nose in every continent on the face of the Earth at one time or another. Anyway, Germany was charged to withdraw to its borders. This caused problems with Poland, as the Germans withdrew to their 1914 borders, which included Wielkopolska – robbed during the 18th century Partitions by the greedy Prussians. A series of skirmishes were fought between the Germans and Poles, which ended when the Allies and the US forced Germany to withdraw to its 1772 eastern border.

  15. “The consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Reich,”

    That was certainly not the case in 1914. The German government declared war on August 1. When the Reichstag came into session on August 4, the Reichstag voted to support the war, but the Reichstag played no role in the Declaration of War, or the invasion of France and Belgium that followed the declaration.

  16. Pretty sure the Federal Council is not the Reichstag, but I was never a student of the government & politics 2nd Reich.

  17. Art Deco wrote, “Permanent” occupation of an area populated with politically mobilized foreigners as cognizant as any of industrial technology, who number about 1/6th of your own population. Sounds like a plan.”

    Of course, the plan envisaged an exchange of populations, with French settlement and repatriation of Germans, similar to that which took place between the Soviet Union and former Eastern Poland or between Chezchoslovakia and Germany after WWII

  18. Donald R McClarey wrote, “After the Great War the Brits were eager to reduce Imperial commitments and hence Southern Irish independence.”

    As long as France was the natural enemy, Britain was anxious to prevent the French, or anyone else, establishing a bridgehead in Ireland. 1798 had been a nasty shock.

    Ireland was an economic liability, as Gladstone recognised, but the Ulster Plantations created an intractable problem that is, at the moment, imperilling the Brexit negotiations. I heard an exchange in our local pub.

    “After all, they’re our kith and kin” said one man

    “Kith my ****” retorted the other.

  19. Quite right Ernst. That is a reference to the Bundesrat, the 25 members of which were appointed by the governments of the states that made up Imperial Germany. 17 of the members were appointed by Prussia, ie by the King of Prussia, who was also the German Emperor. As a practical matter the Bundesrat quickly became a rubber stamp for policy determined by the Kaiser appointed Chancellor of the German Empire who usually also was the Minister President of Prussia. When a genius like Bismarck was at the helm of the system he devised, the German government ran efficiently. Under Kaiser Wilhem II, and the non-entities he favored as his chancellors, it did not. Under the military dictatorship that Germany effectively became in the latter stages of World War I, it set the stage for the fall of the Imperial system in the face of military defeat. The abdication of the Kaiser was announced a hundred years ago today, November 9, 1918.

  20. Ireland was an economic liability,

    Per the Maddison Project, Ireland’s per capita product in 1870 was about 62% of that of Britain. About the same distance separates the London commuter belt and Wales as we speak. I’ll wager you that inter-regional transfers in the British isles mediated through public budgets were in Gladstone’s time quite small and the expense of deploying troops to Ireland was a fraction of what it was in regard to every other British dependency on the planet, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands excepted. Aside from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, Ireland was Britain’s most affluent dependency.

  21. Of course, the plan envisaged an exchange of populations, with French settlement and repatriation of Germans, similar to that which took place between the Soviet Union and former Eastern Poland or between Chezchoslovakia and Germany after WWII

    Do you fancy this improves the quality of his idea?

    Michael, about 6 million Germans lived on the left bank of the Rhine in 1918. Repopulating the territory would have required drawing on 20% of the population of Metropolitan France. Joseph Stalin’s habit of treating people as cannon fodder is not an example we ought to emulate.

  22. Pretty sure the Federal Council is not the Reichstag, but I was never a student of the government & politics 2nd Reich.

    I think dissatisfaction over the division of labor between the Reichstag, the Bundesrat, the Chancellor, and the Emperor isn’t the most compelling justification for devoting the blood and treasure to occupying the entire country, particularly when the German government had made adjustments to it’s institutional architecture before the armistice.

    Some things you might compare: East European political institutions in 1918 with East European institutions 70 years earlier, East European institutions in 1918 with West European institutions 70 years Earlier, and East European institutions with post-bellum American institutions. It was not until after 1860 that it was normal in Western Europe for electorates to comprehend more than a single-digit share of the adult male population. Britain and the Netherlands might have been exceptions, but even there you’re still not talking more than perhaps a quarter of the adult male population, if that. France over the period running from 1814 to 1860 saw maybe three years of broad suffrage (which was allocated to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte). The rest of the time was devoted to Bonaparte’s autocracy (9 years) and to the Restoration and July Monarchy, wherein the suffrage extended to < 3% of the adult male population. As for the situation in 1918, please recall the President was Dr. Woodrow Wilson (b. 1856 in Staunton, Virginia). About a quarter of the population lived at that time lived in ten states wherein 1/3 of the electorate had been kept off the voter rolls through a combination of administrative chicanery and mob violence (see the Ocoee massacre in 1920). Another bloc of the population lived in loci where urban machines and their exuberant vote fraud were the order of the day. Of the 14 men who sat in the president’s chair between 1865 and 1933, maybe three were content with Negro disfranchisement. Wilson was one of the three. There was a limit at the time to the degree to which democratic deficits here there and the next place in Europe should have been motivating.

    The ground was shifting quite rapidly under the feet of Germany’s political class, so it’s a reasonable guess that the monarchy and the nobility would have been sent packing anyway. However, I don’t think it was helpful to reconciling elements of the political spectrum to the post-war settlement to insist that the Kaiser abdicate (which was co-incident with the departure of all the other German monarchs) or to insist on the contrived humiliation of the war-guilt clause.

    Crediting Pershing’s assessment treats the period from 1918 to 1933 as if it were an integral whole not incorporating alternate possible paths at different contingencies. The trouble with that thesis is that prior to 1929, the volkisch element of the German electorate was unimportant, perhaps 3% of the total. It took serial failures by the German political class to make the Nazi Party a salable organization. The worst discrete failure was the 1923-24 hyper-inflation, which in turn was generated by the German governments currency shenanigans in response to reparations bills. Mr. DarwinCatholic keeps telling us all that the Reparations were inconsequential.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.